DrMoab
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Using that logic about 85% ofTRNDRVR said:
would have to call you a republican too.
Is Vladimir Putin a Democrat or Republican?
- Thread starter Ecomike
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would have to call you a republican too.VanillaGorilla
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...no comment.
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VanillaGorilla
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...no comment.
scottmcneal
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SNAP
Darky
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We haven't offered a missile defense system to France, Britain, Iran, North or South Korea, Japan, or Luxembourg either. What's your point?
I doubt Russia would use a nuke so swiftly. Before the defense shield is in place, MAD is still in effect. Afterward, we gain the advantage. But again, unless they have intentions of using them on us or our allies, what's the worry? They gotta know we won't be using ours anytime soon.
I doubt Russia would use a nuke so swiftly. Before the defense shield is in place, MAD is still in effect. Afterward, we gain the advantage. But again, unless they have intentions of using them on us or our allies, what's the worry? They gotta know we won't be using ours anytime soon.
Ecomike
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The more I read about this the more it looks like we are about to step into another Iraq, Afganistan or Vietnam, except this time it would be in the middle of a very old battle between Georgia and Russia that has been going on for 2 centuries. The difference this time being that the Russians have nukes, unlike Vietnam, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Afganistan.
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=15137653
" Marshall Goldman, a leading Russia scholar, argues in a recent book that Putin has established a "petrostate," in which oil and gas are strategically deployed as punishments, rewards and threats. The author details the lengths to which Putin has gone to retain control over the delivery of natural gas from Central Asia to the West. A proposed alternative pipeline would skirt Russia and run through Georgia, as an oil pipeline now does. "If Georgia collapses in turmoil," Goldman notes, "investors will not put up the money for a bypass pipeline." And so, he concludes, Putin has done his best to destabilize the Saakashvili regime.
But economic considerations alone scarcely account for what appears to be an obsession with Georgia. The "color revolutions" that swept across Ukraine, the Balkans and the Caucasus in the first years of the new century plainly unnerved Putin, who has denounced America's policy of "democracy promotion" and stifled foreign organizations seeking to promote human rights in Russia. Georgia, with its open embrace of the West, thus represents a threat to the legitimacy of Russia's authoritarian model. And this challenge is immensely compounded by Georgia's fervent aspiration to join NATO, one of Russia's red lines. Russian officials frequently recall that President Bill Clinton promised Boris Yeltsin that NATO would not expand beyond Eastern Europe. Of course NATO is no longer an anti-Soviet alliance, and the fact that Russia views NATO's eastward expansion as a threat to its security is a vivid sign of the deep-rooted cold war mentality of Putin and his circle.
Still, they seem to mean it. Both Putin and his successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, have reserved their starkest rhetoric for this subject. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has threatened that Georgia's ambition to join NATO "will lead to renewed bloodshed," adding, as if that weren't enough, "we will do anything not to allow Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO."
After Saakashvili, then 37, became president, Putin made no attempt to court him, and Saakashvili, made a point of showing the regional hegemon no deference. The open struggle began in late 2005 and early 2006, when Russia imposed an embargo on Georgia's agricultural products, then on wine and mineral water — virtually Georgia's entire export market. After Georgia very publicly and dramatically expelled Russian diplomats accused of espionage, Putin cut off all land, sea, air and rail links to Georgia, as well as postal service. And then, for good measure, he cut off natural gas supplies in the dead of winter."
"Georgia is a polygot nation, and views both regions as historically, and inextricably, Georgian. Each, however, had its own language, culture, timeless history and separatist aspirations. When the Soviet Union collapsed, both regions sought to separate themselves from Georgia in bloody conflicts — South Ossetia in 1990-1, Abkhazia in 1992-4. Both wars ended with cease-fires that were negotiated by Russia and policed by peacekeeping forces under the aegis of the recently established Commonwealth of Independent States. Over time, the stalemates hardened into "frozen conflicts," like that over Cyprus.
But the Georgians are intensely nationalistic, and viewed these de facto states on their border as an intolerable violation of sovereignty. Saakashvili cashed in on this deep sense of grievance, vowing to restore Georgia's "territorial integrity." Soon after taking office, he succeeded in regaining Georgian control over the southwestern province of Ajara. Then, in the summer of 2004, citing growing banditry and chaos, he sent Interior Ministry troops into South Ossetia. After a series of inconclusive clashes, the troops were forced to make a humiliating withdrawal.
Still, this violation of the status quo infuriated the Russians, and Saakashvili, for once listening to his few dovish advisors, agreed to seek a negotiated settlement in Abkhazia. By late 2005, a Georgian mediator had initialed an agreement: Georgia would not use force, and the Abkhaz would allow the gradual return of 200,000-plus ethnic Georgians who had fled the violence. But the agreement collapsed in early 2006, done in by hardliners on both sides. This chapter has been all but effaced from the history one hears in Georgia."
"his brief interval of talk came to an abrupt end two summers ago, when Saakashvili sent troops to retake the Kodori Valley in Abkhazia — in order, once again, to curb banditry (of which there was, in fact, a great deal). Both the Abkhaz and the Russians took this as a sign that Georgia was prepared to fight to regain its former province. Indeed, last year Saakashvili traveled to the Abkhaz border and promised a crowd of Georgian refugees that they would be back home within a year.
The breakaway regions were thus a stick of dynamite waiting to be lit. And Putin struck a match. Although Russia, as the peacekeeping power, was charged with preserving an international consensus that recognized Georgia's claims over Abkhazia, Russia lifted sanctions on Abkhazia last March. This had nothing to do with local events: Putin had tried for years to prevent Kosovo from declaring its independence from Serbia, and when the Kosovars went ahead, with strong American and European support, last February, Putin responded by leveling a blow at America's Caucasus darling.
Soon afterward, the Russian Duma held hearings on recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway republic in Moldova. Moscow argued that the West's logic on Kosovo should apply as well to these ethnic communities seeking to free themselves from the control of a hostile state. And then, in mid-April, Putin held out the possibility of recognition for the breakaway republics.
Now things began to degenerate rapidly. On April 21, Saakashvili called the Russian leader to demand that he reverse the decision. He reminded Putin that the West had taken Georgia's side in the dispute. And Putin, according to several of Saakashvili's associates, shot back with a suggestion about where they could put their statements. Saakashvili, prudent for once, shied from uttering the exact wording, but said that Putin had used "extremely offensive language," and had repeated the expression several times."
"
The atmosphere during the early spring was electric with tension. Georgia accused Russia of shooting down a drone aircraft over Abkhazia; a United Nations report later confirmed the claim. Russia loudly insisted that Georgia was preparing for war; the Georgians had, indeed, mobilized troops and prepared fuel dumps.
Russia responded to the apparent Georgian preparations by dispatching 400 paratroopers and a battery of howitzers to a staging area not far from the cease-fire line, provoking a strong protest from NATO. "At the end of the day, we were very close to war" on May 9, says Temuri Yacobashvili, the Georgian minister of reintegration and a Saakashvili confidant. In fact, diplomats in Georgia and elsewhere give somewhat more credence to the Russian claims than to Georgia's. State Department officials urged Saakashvili to calm down. Perhaps each side was trying to provoke the other into striking first, and thus losing the battle of public opinion. Of course, that's how wars often start."
"
Talking to the Georgians about Abkhazia, and the Abkhaz about Georgia, was like shuttling between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Georgians said that they were "always there," that Abkhazia was a Georgian kingdom, and that only by expelling the ethnic Georgians at the end of the war did the Abkhaz make themselves a majority in the province. The Abkhaz said that they are the descendants of a "1,000-year-old kingdom," that they were the victims of a massive campaign of Russian deportation in the 1860s, and then that Stalin forced them into the Georgian yoke. The Abkhaz talk about the Georgians pretty much the same way that the Georgians talk about the Russians. On that point, the Abkhaz share much with the South Ossetians. For them, as for the Ossetians, Georgia is the neighborhood bully.
It's a pretty safe bet that Georgia and Abkhazia will not resolve their conflict on their own. Both breakaway regions are quite willing to live with the Russian-enforced status quo, but even relatively moderate Georgian officials consider that status quo utterly unacceptable. When I asked Temuri Yacobashvili, a cultivated man who is one of the country's leading art patrons, why Georgia couldn't focus on the threat from Russia and let the Abkhaz have their de facto state, he said, "These are not two different things, because it's not amputating hand, it's amputating head, or heart. No Georgian president could survive if he gave up on Abkhazia." And, he added, "if the international community by its inaction will not leave any other option for Georgia, then we have to make decision."
If the West, that is, won't induce Russia to stop using the border region as a pawn, Georgia will be left with no choice save war."
"The situation in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia took yet another turn down the spiral of confrontation in July, when mysterious acts of violence plagued both regions. There were bombings in Abkhazia. There were shootings in South Ossetia. Who was behind the string of attacks? Criminal gangs? Provocateurs? Georgian secret agents? No one knew, but that didn't stop the accusations from flying. Abkhazia closed the cease-fire line, then cut all ties with Georgia. On July 8, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about to visit Georgia, Russia sent fighter jets over South Ossetia. Georgian Interior Ministry forces squared off against civilians in South Ossetia. The pot was boiling. And then, last week, the lid blew in South Ossetia, for reasons that remain unclear. Diplomats are now laboring mightily to prevent the war from spreading, though hostilities may serve too many different interests to be easily contained."
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=15137653
" Marshall Goldman, a leading Russia scholar, argues in a recent book that Putin has established a "petrostate," in which oil and gas are strategically deployed as punishments, rewards and threats. The author details the lengths to which Putin has gone to retain control over the delivery of natural gas from Central Asia to the West. A proposed alternative pipeline would skirt Russia and run through Georgia, as an oil pipeline now does. "If Georgia collapses in turmoil," Goldman notes, "investors will not put up the money for a bypass pipeline." And so, he concludes, Putin has done his best to destabilize the Saakashvili regime.
But economic considerations alone scarcely account for what appears to be an obsession with Georgia. The "color revolutions" that swept across Ukraine, the Balkans and the Caucasus in the first years of the new century plainly unnerved Putin, who has denounced America's policy of "democracy promotion" and stifled foreign organizations seeking to promote human rights in Russia. Georgia, with its open embrace of the West, thus represents a threat to the legitimacy of Russia's authoritarian model. And this challenge is immensely compounded by Georgia's fervent aspiration to join NATO, one of Russia's red lines. Russian officials frequently recall that President Bill Clinton promised Boris Yeltsin that NATO would not expand beyond Eastern Europe. Of course NATO is no longer an anti-Soviet alliance, and the fact that Russia views NATO's eastward expansion as a threat to its security is a vivid sign of the deep-rooted cold war mentality of Putin and his circle.
Still, they seem to mean it. Both Putin and his successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, have reserved their starkest rhetoric for this subject. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has threatened that Georgia's ambition to join NATO "will lead to renewed bloodshed," adding, as if that weren't enough, "we will do anything not to allow Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO."
After Saakashvili, then 37, became president, Putin made no attempt to court him, and Saakashvili, made a point of showing the regional hegemon no deference. The open struggle began in late 2005 and early 2006, when Russia imposed an embargo on Georgia's agricultural products, then on wine and mineral water — virtually Georgia's entire export market. After Georgia very publicly and dramatically expelled Russian diplomats accused of espionage, Putin cut off all land, sea, air and rail links to Georgia, as well as postal service. And then, for good measure, he cut off natural gas supplies in the dead of winter."
"Georgia is a polygot nation, and views both regions as historically, and inextricably, Georgian. Each, however, had its own language, culture, timeless history and separatist aspirations. When the Soviet Union collapsed, both regions sought to separate themselves from Georgia in bloody conflicts — South Ossetia in 1990-1, Abkhazia in 1992-4. Both wars ended with cease-fires that were negotiated by Russia and policed by peacekeeping forces under the aegis of the recently established Commonwealth of Independent States. Over time, the stalemates hardened into "frozen conflicts," like that over Cyprus.
But the Georgians are intensely nationalistic, and viewed these de facto states on their border as an intolerable violation of sovereignty. Saakashvili cashed in on this deep sense of grievance, vowing to restore Georgia's "territorial integrity." Soon after taking office, he succeeded in regaining Georgian control over the southwestern province of Ajara. Then, in the summer of 2004, citing growing banditry and chaos, he sent Interior Ministry troops into South Ossetia. After a series of inconclusive clashes, the troops were forced to make a humiliating withdrawal.
Still, this violation of the status quo infuriated the Russians, and Saakashvili, for once listening to his few dovish advisors, agreed to seek a negotiated settlement in Abkhazia. By late 2005, a Georgian mediator had initialed an agreement: Georgia would not use force, and the Abkhaz would allow the gradual return of 200,000-plus ethnic Georgians who had fled the violence. But the agreement collapsed in early 2006, done in by hardliners on both sides. This chapter has been all but effaced from the history one hears in Georgia."
"his brief interval of talk came to an abrupt end two summers ago, when Saakashvili sent troops to retake the Kodori Valley in Abkhazia — in order, once again, to curb banditry (of which there was, in fact, a great deal). Both the Abkhaz and the Russians took this as a sign that Georgia was prepared to fight to regain its former province. Indeed, last year Saakashvili traveled to the Abkhaz border and promised a crowd of Georgian refugees that they would be back home within a year.
The breakaway regions were thus a stick of dynamite waiting to be lit. And Putin struck a match. Although Russia, as the peacekeeping power, was charged with preserving an international consensus that recognized Georgia's claims over Abkhazia, Russia lifted sanctions on Abkhazia last March. This had nothing to do with local events: Putin had tried for years to prevent Kosovo from declaring its independence from Serbia, and when the Kosovars went ahead, with strong American and European support, last February, Putin responded by leveling a blow at America's Caucasus darling.
Soon afterward, the Russian Duma held hearings on recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway republic in Moldova. Moscow argued that the West's logic on Kosovo should apply as well to these ethnic communities seeking to free themselves from the control of a hostile state. And then, in mid-April, Putin held out the possibility of recognition for the breakaway republics.
Now things began to degenerate rapidly. On April 21, Saakashvili called the Russian leader to demand that he reverse the decision. He reminded Putin that the West had taken Georgia's side in the dispute. And Putin, according to several of Saakashvili's associates, shot back with a suggestion about where they could put their statements. Saakashvili, prudent for once, shied from uttering the exact wording, but said that Putin had used "extremely offensive language," and had repeated the expression several times."
"
The atmosphere during the early spring was electric with tension. Georgia accused Russia of shooting down a drone aircraft over Abkhazia; a United Nations report later confirmed the claim. Russia loudly insisted that Georgia was preparing for war; the Georgians had, indeed, mobilized troops and prepared fuel dumps.
Russia responded to the apparent Georgian preparations by dispatching 400 paratroopers and a battery of howitzers to a staging area not far from the cease-fire line, provoking a strong protest from NATO. "At the end of the day, we were very close to war" on May 9, says Temuri Yacobashvili, the Georgian minister of reintegration and a Saakashvili confidant. In fact, diplomats in Georgia and elsewhere give somewhat more credence to the Russian claims than to Georgia's. State Department officials urged Saakashvili to calm down. Perhaps each side was trying to provoke the other into striking first, and thus losing the battle of public opinion. Of course, that's how wars often start."
"
Talking to the Georgians about Abkhazia, and the Abkhaz about Georgia, was like shuttling between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Georgians said that they were "always there," that Abkhazia was a Georgian kingdom, and that only by expelling the ethnic Georgians at the end of the war did the Abkhaz make themselves a majority in the province. The Abkhaz said that they are the descendants of a "1,000-year-old kingdom," that they were the victims of a massive campaign of Russian deportation in the 1860s, and then that Stalin forced them into the Georgian yoke. The Abkhaz talk about the Georgians pretty much the same way that the Georgians talk about the Russians. On that point, the Abkhaz share much with the South Ossetians. For them, as for the Ossetians, Georgia is the neighborhood bully.
It's a pretty safe bet that Georgia and Abkhazia will not resolve their conflict on their own. Both breakaway regions are quite willing to live with the Russian-enforced status quo, but even relatively moderate Georgian officials consider that status quo utterly unacceptable. When I asked Temuri Yacobashvili, a cultivated man who is one of the country's leading art patrons, why Georgia couldn't focus on the threat from Russia and let the Abkhaz have their de facto state, he said, "These are not two different things, because it's not amputating hand, it's amputating head, or heart. No Georgian president could survive if he gave up on Abkhazia." And, he added, "if the international community by its inaction will not leave any other option for Georgia, then we have to make decision."
If the West, that is, won't induce Russia to stop using the border region as a pawn, Georgia will be left with no choice save war."
"The situation in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia took yet another turn down the spiral of confrontation in July, when mysterious acts of violence plagued both regions. There were bombings in Abkhazia. There were shootings in South Ossetia. Who was behind the string of attacks? Criminal gangs? Provocateurs? Georgian secret agents? No one knew, but that didn't stop the accusations from flying. Abkhazia closed the cease-fire line, then cut all ties with Georgia. On July 8, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about to visit Georgia, Russia sent fighter jets over South Ossetia. Georgian Interior Ministry forces squared off against civilians in South Ossetia. The pot was boiling. And then, last week, the lid blew in South Ossetia, for reasons that remain unclear. Diplomats are now laboring mightily to prevent the war from spreading, though hostilities may serve too many different interests to be easily contained."
Darky
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- 29 Palms, CA
So, long story short, Russia doesn't want Georgia to succeed away from them. They've cut off Georgia's supply lines for export, thus hurting their economy; cut off the gas in the middle of winter, most likely, causing many deaths from exposure; made multiple threats to keep Georgia from seeking friendships with countries not threatening them with death, etc etc. Sounds like somebody we really want to appease...
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Oh boy....... please tell me that you don't actually believe that...Ecomike said:
- Location
- Westminster, SoCal
Ummm ummmmm I think you're really slightly missing some of the points. The missile defense system installed in Poland is there to intercept as soon as possible missiles that are going towards the older NATO territories.....Ecomike said:
But to summarize: in essence you're saying that if someone wants to do something in conjunctino with another party if Russians say: we don't want you to do it, you're going to not do it and listen to them?
fscrig75
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Ecomike said:
IMO yes I think it was ok to go into Iraq. I do also wonder why we never went after Stallin, Gen Patton wanted and its hard to argue with that guy.
Ecomike said:
Yes we all know about MAD, but what I think your failing to see is that we already have a missile defense shield for America. Its been up and running for awhile now, and I don't remember hearing Russia b*itching about that, do you? Oh Russia has had a missile defense system too.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-135_anti-ballistic_missile_system
Russia believes that this system can be for offensive purposes, I'm sure there is some gee wiz engineer that could reprogram the thing, and yes we probably have looked into that, but as it stands right now they don't do that. Yes missiles can be reconfigured but theres a lot more to it than just pointing and shooting. On this system the radar that is tracking the incoming missile also guides the outbound missile. Offensive missiles work on GPS that are built into the missile. Then you have to get into the minimum/maximum distance the the interceptor can fly. Its not easy to reconfigure the missiles.
Here is some light reading about our systems. Neither is exactly what they want to put in Europe but the operation idea is about the same.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/THAAD
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_missile
And it isn't just the US that is pushing for this system its our allies, NATO, that wants it installed too.
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/04/03/nato.members/index.html
Ecomike said:
Wops, actually they went into South Osetia trying to find local guerrillas, that have been using South Osetia has their base of operations. Though they probably did have the support of the Russians.
Ecomike said:
Can you blame them, the Iranian president tells the world every chance he gets that he will wipe Israel off the map if he gets the chance. And I believe he will do it.
:cheers:
fosforito_one
NAXJA Forum User
- Location
- Orem, UT
fscrig75 said:
AMEN!!! I couldn't have said it better myself!
arty: That was interesting about the reprograming of their missil defence system. That never occured to me and it was the first I had heard of it.
DrMoab
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- The Utah Backwater
Polls are tied 50/50. There is a very good chance we will get another Republican in office.TRNDRVR said:
fscrig75
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- Burkburnett/Lawton
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/20/poland.us.missile/index.html
Well its a done deal. Looks like the ball is in Russia's court.
Well its a done deal. Looks like the ball is in Russia's court.
Ecomike
NAXJA# 2091
- Location
- MilkyWay Galaxy
Hopefully they won't lob an explosive ball back to our court.fscrig75 said:
I hear Rice called Putins threats pathetic today. Nothing like tossing fuel on the fire.
Ecomike
NAXJA# 2091
- Location
- MilkyWay Galaxy
Been reading those links and found this!fscrig75 said:
"
The U.S. Army claimed an initial success rate of 80% in Saudi Arabia and 50% in Israel. Those claims were eventually scaled back to 70% and 40%. However, when President George H. W. Bush traveled to Raytheon's Patriot manufacturing plant in Andover, Massachusetts during the Gulf War, he declared, the "Patriot is 41 for 42: 42 Scuds engaged, 41 intercepted!"[8] The President's claimed success rate was thus over 97% during the war.
On April 7, 1992 Theodore Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Reuven Pedatzur of Tel Aviv University testified before a House Committee stating that, according to their independent analyses, the Patriot system had a success rate of below 10%, and perhaps even a zero success rate. In response to this testimony and other evidence, the staff of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security reported, "The Patriot missile system was not the spectacular success in the Persian Gulf War that the American public was led to believe. There is little evidence to prove that the Patriot hit more than a few Scud missiles launched by Iraq during the Gulf War, and there are some doubts about even these engagements. The public and the United States Congress were misled by definitive statements of success issued by administration and Raytheon representatives during and after the war."[9]"
fscrig75
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- Location
- Burkburnett/Lawton
Ecomike said:
That girl's got fire. But actually it was the NATO Secretary General that orginally called the threats pathetic, she just repeated what he said. But since she is American she will get all the blame.
I'd vote Rice for prez any day of the week!
fscrig75
NAXJA Forum User
- Location
- Burkburnett/Lawton
Ecomike said:
The only thing I know about the Persian Gulf War, is that the Patriot system was initially designed for ABT(Air Breathing Threat, Airplanes). When the Gulf war came around all anyone was worried about was Sadams Scuds. They did some computer reprogramming and decided to try the system against inbound TBM (Tactical Ballistic Missile). Was the system perfect at that time, no it was being tested under fire. Was it the only system that we had yes. And trust me we have learned a lot since then!
One of the reasons the success rate is so low is the system does not engage every missile that is fired. These systems are not area defense, but point, large points.
So lets say that 10 missiles are fired Vegas, the radar and computer make a determination of where they will land. If only 1 in 10 are going to hit Vegas, then only that missile will be engaged. The other 9 will be allowed to impact where ever.
So in the end we've only killed 10% of the missiles fired at us, but we killed 100% of the missiles that was going to impact in our defended area.
- Location
- Wasatch Range
fscrig75 said:
Now wouldn't that just one-up the DNC........an intelligent black woman President!
Also explains why she would never run for President.